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I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing is harder to kill than a good myth. Beat on it with the
hard facts, and it will hardly notice. Chop off its head, and it
will grow another one by nightfall.'
There is a widespread belief both in the United States and
* A.B. 1959, A.M. 1961, Ph.L. 1961, St. Louis University; Ph.D. 1965, Harvard
University; Professor of English, UCLA.
1. Donal Henahan, Music Views, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1990, at H21.
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abroad that United States law permits dual nationality only to mi-
nors and requires them to elect one allegiance and to repudiate the
other upon reaching majority. This belief is false. There is not now,
nor has there ever been, any such restriction or requirement in
force, either by statute or by binding judicial precedent. If certain
dual citizens find themselves faced with a choice between citizen-
ships, the requirement is that of the foreign country, not that of
the United States.
In the pages that follow, I will first discuss present-day law as
interpreted by the State Department. I will then attempt to ex-
plain some of the ways in which the myth of election originated
and was propagated, not least through misinterpretations of law by
both the judiciary and officials of the State Department. In the
course of my discussion, I will review past and present laws on the
gain and loss of nationality, especially the effects of the 1986 legal
reforms and the new policy adopted by the State Department in
1990. I will show that it is now much harder for U.S. citizens,
whether single or dual, to lose U.S. citizenship, and much easier to
acquire other citizenships, even as adults. Finally, I will give some
practical examples and advice to present and potential dual citi-
zens on how to protect or acquire dual status.
II. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON CURRENT LAW
I will not detail here the twenty years of misinformation that I
have received from every level of official and nonofficial sources,
including U.S. and Australian passport, consular, and legislative
offices, and even, directly and indirectly, from the State Depart-
ment in Washington. I will only note that the first account of the
true state of the law that I was able to receive came from officers
staffing the various national desks of the Overseas Citizens Ser-
vices (OCS) of the State Department, who verified the statement
of law that I gave in my opening paragraph: there is no constitu-
tional, statutory, or judicial provision prohibiting a U.S. citizen
from holding at the same time citizenship of another country, or
requiring a dual national to relinquish either his U.S. or his foreign
citizenship. On the day that I received this verification by the
OCS, June 28, 1989, I was sent two versions of the State Depart-
ment leaflet on Dual Nationality. The fuller version, which I in-
clude in Appendix 1,2 is a splendidly simple and mainly accurate
2. Appendix I is an edition of U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATIONALITY. I have
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explanation of the law as it stands today, with citations of relevant
statutes and Supreme Court decisions.
The leaflet should answer most of the practical questions one
might have about double citizenship and the use of passports. I
have only one correction of fact to make, and one query of law.
The correction concerns the statement, "[t]he current nationality
laws of the United States do not specifically refer to dual national-
ity."' 3 As I will show below,' there is still such a reference in section
1481(a)(4)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as
amended in 1986. 5 The legal query concerns the alleged require-
ment of U.S. citizens to use U.S. passports when entering or leav-
ing the United States. The authors base this stipulation on section
1185(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as
amended in 1978,6 which makes it "unlawful for any citizen of the
United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from
or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport."7 Be-
cause the law does not address the question of dual citizens at this
point, the supposition is that each citizen would have only one
valid passport, namely, a U.S. passport, and that it was to be used.
But since this section is a criminal statute and must therefore be
narrowly construed,8 it is arguable that any valid passport would
do. Suppose that my children's U.S. passports had expired when
they last departed from the United States and that they were
travelling on their valid Australian passports intending to renew
their U.S. passports in Sydney. Could they not be said to have ful-
filled the letter of the law? (Practically speaking, of course, the
question would not normally come up, since the United States as a
rule does not inspect passports of its departing citizens-except as
delegated to airline ticket agents-and does not use exit stamps.)
III. THE VARIETIES OF ELECTION
I will draw more practical conclusions later, but now I wish to
noted a modification made after the departmental change of policy in April 1990. See infra
App. I.
3. Infra App. I, para. [5].
4. Infra notes 100-05, 147-51 and accompanying text.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A).
6. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1185(b) (West Supp. 1991). In the original 1952 Act, this requirement
was in force only during wartime or a proclaimed national emergency.
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
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examine how the "folklaw" of election originated and came to be
so deeply entrenched on all levels of domestic and foreign con-
sciousness, in the federal judiciary, and in standard law texts. One
of the first things I found when I began to research this question
was the following seemingly authoritative statement: "Those indi-
viduals in the status of dual nationals have the duty to make an
election of nationality within reasonable time established by Con-
gress under the naturalization law, or accept the consequences of
their passive attitude." How did such a mistaken notion come to
be enshrined in this way? Part of the answer, I will try to show,
results from confusion over meanings of the term "election."
Various notions of election existed in this country before en-
actment of the first expatriation statute in 1907. In an 1863 New
York case, Ludlam v. Ludlam,"0 there was reference to one's
"right" to elect one citizenship and repudiate the other on reaching
maturity.1" In a 1907 Vermont case, State v. Jackson,2 the court
said that dual citizens on acquiring maturity had made the "neces-
sary" election "whether [they] would conserve the citizenship of
the United States or that of Canada."' 3 In 1939, in Perkins v.
Elg.," Chief Justice Hughes took note of the long-recognized prin-
ciple of American policy that a person born in the United States of
foreign parents who is taken abroad and acquires citizenship there
must on reaching majority "elect to retain" U.S. citizenship and
also "elect to return" to the United States to assume the duties of
citizenship, or else suffer loss of U.S. citizenship."
It should be clear that election has quite different meanings in
these three cases. Only in the first two cases does it mean that one
chooses between two citizenships. In the first case, one has the
right to choose, whereas in the second case, one allegedly has an
obligation, to choose. In the third case, one simply reaffirms U.S.
citizenship and decides whether to live in the U.S. or to continue
living in the other country. Choosing the latter would, of course,
effect a forfeit-rather than a renunciation-of U.S. citizenship.
9. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503 n.33 (West 1970)(citing Gaudio v. Dulles, 110 F. Supp. 706, 710
(D.C. Cir. 1953)).
10. 26 N.Y. 356 (1863).
11. Id. at 371-72.
12. 65 A. 657 (Vt. 1907).
13. Id at 661-62. The court was mistaken in holding this view. See Richard W.
Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 693, 697-701 (1920-21).
14. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
15. Id. at 329, 331.
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However, there is no implication at all that the reaffirmation of the
American nationality and return to American soil entails loss of
the other nationality or repudiation of allegiance to the foreign
country. It would, of course, be up to the laws of the other country
to determine what effect, if any, such acts would have on one's citi-
zenship in that country.
The policy to which Chief Justice Hughes referred in Perkins
v. Elg had yet to be incorporated into law at the time that he was
writing. The 1907 Expatriation Act"6 required only that U.S. citi-
zens who were born abroad and who remained abroad, in order to
receive the protection of the U.S. government, were to record at
the age of eighteen their intention to become U.S. residents and
remain U.S. citizens. 7 At twenty-one they were to take "the oath
of allegiance."18 However, as Judge Smith pointed out in Rueff v.
Brownell, 9 "[e]ven under this section the failure of a citizen to
comply with its provisions will deprive him of his right to diplo-
matic protection but will not deprive him of his citizenship."20
IV. EXPATRIATION, DEPATRIATION, AND THE LAWS OF DUALS
Let us now look at the various laws of expatriation passed in
the United States as they have affected dual nationals. There have
been attempts in recent years to emphasize the difference between
voluntary expatriation (i.e:, a person's intentional renunciation or
relinquishing of citizenship) and the deprivation of citizenship by
government decree against the individual's will. The term chosen
for this latter concept is "denationalization," meaning "making a
national to be no longer a national."'" But since denationalization
in general speech nowadays refers to the restoring of a nationalized
industry to private status, I suggest replacing that term with
"depatriation," on the analogy of deportation. The term depatria-
tion would be most appropriately restricted to cases where loss of
16. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 6, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229 (1907)(repealed 1940).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1953).
20. Id. at 305.
21. See MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1967); Sir John
Fisher Williams, Denationalization, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 45 (1927); Richard R. Gray, Com-
ment, Expatriation--A Concept in Need of Clarification, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 388
(1975); Therese Keelaghan-Silvestre, Comment, Dual Nationality and the Problem of Ex-
patriation, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 291-92 (1981); Patricia McGarvey-Rosendahl, Comment, A
New Approach to Dual Nationality, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 305, 316-17 (1986).
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citizenship occurs automatically by operation of law, without any
action taken on the part of the citizen, or as the result of the citi-
zen's failure to take an action stipulated by law. It would be less
appropriately applied to actions that a government has defined as
"equivalent to expatriation," so that when one performs them vol-
untarily, loss of citizenship occurs, even though one does not in-
tend this effect or even know about it. Thus, in the first Expatria-
tion Act of 1907,22 it is stated in section 2 that "any American
citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has
been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or
when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state."23 In
this situation, which Perkins v. Elg says was not meant to apply to
minors,24 it makes some sense to speak of "voluntary expatriation"
when one does such an act with the intention of relinquishing citi-
zenship. One should, however, speak of "voluntary but undesired
expatriation" when loss of citizenship is not wanted but is ac-
cepted as a necessary concomitant to what one does desire: citizen-
ship in another country. It might even make sense to speak of "un-
witting expatriation" here, since the 1907 Act does not allow for
ignorance of the law as an excuse. But if we limit our understand-
ing of expatriation as Hughes does in Elg by stating,
"[e]xpatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance,"25 then the use of the term "depatria-
tion" would be more appropriate.
In effect, the cited provision of the 1907 Act prohibits adults
from becoming dual nationals by decreeing that those who take on
another nationality expatriate themselves.26 The Act does not di-
rectly address the case of those who are already dual nationals.2 7
Section 2 does place restrictions on naturalized citizens residing
abroad: "When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two
years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in
any other foreign state, it shall be presumed that he has ceased to
be an American citizen. ' 28 But, as pointed out by Judge Smith, in
Rueif, this is quite different from saying that the person has expa-
22. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907) (repealed 1940).
23. Id.
24. 307 U.S. at 342.
25. Id. at 334.






The first U.S. expatriation law, then, said nothing explicit
about dual nationals, much less about imposing an election be-
tween nationalities. But in 1929 and 1930, as part of a proposal to
eliminate all dual nationality in adults, the U.S. government did
support something of the sort as a matter of international law. The
Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality of 19290 proposed that
dual or multiple nationals should retain only the nationality of the
country where they habitually resided on attaining the age of
twenty-three." The U.S. proposal to the Hague Conference of 1930
added a more voluntary element: a dual national may renounce
one of his or her nationalities. However, if this is not done before
reaching the age of twenty-three, he or she shall "be conclusively
presumed to have elected the nationality3 s2 of the country of ha-
bitual residence "and to have renounced the nationality of the
other State of which he [or she] was a national."33
It has been asserted that the United States did not sign the
Hague Convention because this proposal was rejected in favor of a
policy allowing states alone to decide which nationality would be
relinquished and which retained.3 4 The United States, in other
words, preferred voluntary expatriation over involuntary denation-
alization,35 or, to use my term, depatriation. But it would be more
precise to say that the U.S. proposal allowed for voluntary expatri-
ation up to a certain age and then imposed depatriation. A few
years after the relatively mature age of twenty-three was suggested
for depatriation in the above proposal, the 1934 Citizenship Act
provided for automatic depatriation at the age of thirteen for chil-
dren born abroad whose U.S. citizenship comes from having one
American parent, whether father or mother, unless they took up
29. 116 F. Supp. at 304-05; supra text accompanying note 20. See also Williams, supra
note 21, at 48 (Loss of citizenship in this case could only be determined by a judicial deci-
sion. The result would be, properly speaking, "denaturalization.").
30. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Nationality (1929), in 23
AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (Supp. 1929).
31. Id. art. 12, at 14.
32. Act of the Conference for the Codification of International Law Held at the Hague
from March 13th to April 12th, 1930: Minutes of the First Committee, League of Nations
Doc. C.351(a) M.145(a) 1930 V. Annex II, 295, reprinted in 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1175 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1975).
33. Id.
34. See Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, art. 6, 179
L.N.T.S. 91, 101; McGarvey-Rosendahl, supra note 21, at 318.
35. McGarvey-Rosendahl, supra note 21, at 318.
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residence in the United States.3 6 The operative age was changed in
subsequent acts.3"
Other than the persons covered in the 1934 Citizenship Act,
citizens living abroad were not affected by any law or loss of citi-
zenship, although many were erroneously told by State Depart-
ment and consular officials in the 1930s that they had lost their
citizenship through foreign residence.38 Section 401(a) of the 1940
Act," however, stipulated that any U.S. citizen, whether by birth
or naturalization, who was naturalized in another country before
the age of twenty-one must return to the United States before
reaching twenty-three or lose his U.S. citizenship.40 The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 "1 extended the term to twenty-
five years of age.
42
Let me bring up here an incident that first inspired me to
wonder whether the requirement of election was a myth. When I
was on sabbatical in Sydney in 1980, a dinner companion who
practiced law in New South Wales informed me that when, not
long ago, he had tried to get a U.S. visa on his recently renewed
Australian passport, he was told by the U.S. Consulate that he was
a U.S. citizen and should instead apply for a U.S. passport. He
acknowledged that he was born in the United States; but, since he
had been taken to Australia as an infant and had moreover sworn
allegiance to the Queen on several occasions, he had assumed that
he had lost any claim to U.S. citizenship. Not so, he was assured;
and his having been called up to serve in the Australian armed
forces during World War II would have had no effect on his U.S.
citizenship, since it was compulsory rather than voluntary. He did
36. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1993, 48 Stat. 797 (1934) (repealed 1940). It was the
first time that women could pass on citizenship.
37. The Nationality Act of 1940 changed the age to sixteen. Act of Oct. 14, 1940,
§ 201(g), 54 Stat. 1137, 1339 (1940). The 1952 Act put it at twenty-three. Act of June 27,
1952, § 301(b), 66 Stat. 235, 236 (1952) (repealed by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
432, § 2(4), 92 Stat. 1046 (1978)(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1986))). Thus, a
child born abroad before May 24, 1934, would be a citizen and not affected by this provision
if the father was American; if only the mother was an American, he or she would not be a
citizen at all. A child born after May 24, 1934 of an American father or mother would be
slated to lose U.S. citizenship by operation of law in 1947 but would actually lose it in 1950;
he or she would be "repatriated" (that is, undepatriated) in 1952, redepatriated in 1957, and
finally re-repatriated in 1978.
38. Rueff v. Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298, 306 (D.N.J. 1953); see infra note 49.
39. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, § 401(a), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940)(repealed 1952).
40. Id. at 1169.




not argue the matter further-by bringing up, for instance, the
matter of his having voted regularly in Australian elections. Since
that time he has carried both Australian and U.S. passports, and,
when renewing the one, he freely admits his possession of the
other.
But had not my commensal forfeited his citizenship long ago,
under the above-described section of the 1940 Act, which man-
dated his return to the United States by the age of twenty-three,
and were not the officials of the consulate in error when they gave
him a U.S. passport, since it was before the 1986 repeal? The an-
swer would seem to be that he had not forfeited his citizenship
under this provision, which applied only to U.S. citizens who ac-
quired a second nationality by naturalization as minors; he was
born in the United States of an Australian father who took him to
Australia at the age of two months. But the consular officials were
indeed mistaken in saying that he had never lost his citizenship,
since the next section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, sec-
tion 1482, did apply to him: dual nationals by birth who resided in
their other country for any three years after reaching twenty-two
would lose their U.S. citizenship unless they took an oath of alle-
giance to the United States before the end of the three years and
took up U.S. residence.43 However, the officials seem to have been
right, if for the wrong reasons, in issuing him a U.S. passport, be-
cause this provision had been repealed in 1978 as being of dubious
constitutionality;44 and other provisions of section 1481 which
might have affected him had similarly been repealed, as we shall
see.
45
V. THE 1952 SUPREME COURT: KAWAKITA AND MANDOLI
The Nationality Act of 1940 came under scrutiny in the case
of Tomoya Kawakita v. United States46 in 1952. Kawakita was a
dual national by birth, having been born in the United States of
Japanese parents. In 1939, shortly before turning eighteen, he ob-
tained a U.S. passport and went to Japan, where he registered as a
U.S. citizen. In 1941, he renewed his U.S. passport, once more tak-
43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1482 (West 1970) (repealed 1978).
44. See CHARLES GORDON & E. GrrrL GORDON, 4 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
LAW, § 20.9k, at 20-31 (Student ed., 1982).
45. Infra Part VII.
46. 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
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ing the customary oath of allegiance to the United States. But
when war was declared he registered as a Japanese citizen and ob-
tained a Japanese passport, on which he traveled to China. After
the war, he renewed his U.S. citizenship, and stated that he had
not expatriated himself. Back in the United States, he was recog-
nized by a former American prisoner of war, who accused him of
mistreating American prisoners during the war when he served as
an interpreter. He was convicted of treason in 1951 and con-
demned to death. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that
he had in fact expatriated himself by his actions in Japan. His ap-
peal was narrowly rejected, by a four-to-three vote.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority (with Jackson, Reed,
and Minton), stated of Kawakita: "He had a dual nationality, a
status long recognized in the law."'4 7 Douglas continued:
The concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may
have and exercise rights of nationality in two countries and be
subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact that he as-
serts the rights of one citizenship does not without more mean
that he renounces the other. . . . [Dual citizenship] could not
exist if the assertion of rights or the assumption of liabilities of
one were deemed inconsistent with the maintenance of the
other. For example, when one has a dual citizenship, it is not
necessarily inconsistent with his citizenship in one nation to use
a passport proclaiming his citizenship in the other."'
Douglas referred to a statement of Assistant Secretary of State
Carr in 1933 affirming that a dual national would not be divested
of U.S. citizenship by use of a passport from the other nationality,
but that it would be advisable to obtain a U.S. passport to be as-
sured of U.S. protection. 9
The Supreme Court found that Kawakita's various activities
47. Id. at 723 (citing Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 344-49 (1939)).
48. Id. at 723-25.
49. Id. at 725 (citing GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
353-55 (1942)). Douglas's language was quoted by Judge Smith in Rueff v. Brownell, 116 F.
Supp. 298, 309 (1953), on another passport question. In this case, a Miss Torrance (later
Mrs. Rueff), born in Germany in 1910 of U.S. citizens and later acquiring German citizen-
ship as a minor upon the naturalization of her mother, had renewed her German passport in
1936. Judge Smith ruled that she would have been free to do so in any event, but in her case
the German passport was the only one available to her, since the U.S. Consulate in 1933 had
erroneously informed her that she had lost her U.S. citizenship. He acknowledged that
under the 1940 Act, section 401(a), she was obliged to return to the United States by Janu-
ary 13, 1943, but he pointed out that her attempts to comply had been thwarted by the
State Department "under a mistake of law." 116 F. Supp. at 306.
430 [Vol. 23:2
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did not effect a renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. Vinson, Black,
and Burton dissented, but, of course, the original sentence of death
was upheld and rehearing was denied on October 13, 1952. This
was just a month before a rehearing of the Rosenberg case was de-
nied. Everybody knows that the Rosenbergs were executed for
treason, but what happened to Kawakita? In December, 1952, the
federal court refused to commute his death sentence, but a year
later, on October 29, 1953, President Eisenhower did commute it to
life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, and Kawakita was sent to
Alcatraz.5" After spending a total of sixteen and a half years in
prison and being ineligible for parole until 1968, he was condition-
ally pardoned by President Kennedy on October 24, 1963 (just two
weeks before Kennedy's assassination). 1 His fine was remitted and
the life sentence was commuted "to expire at once on condition
that the said Tomoya Kawakita be deported to Japan and that
should he ever be found within the territorial limits of the United
States that he be committed to serve the remainder of the afore-
said life sentence."5 ' In other words, he was given a choice of con-
tinued imprisonment or exile. He had lost his U.S. citizenship
under the 1940 Act, section 401(h), when convicted of treason, 53
and he had also lost his Japanese nationality along the way. He
flew to Tokyo as a stateless person and was immediately given Jap-
anese citizenship. 4 In 1978, still protesting his innocence,
Kawakita sought to obtain a visa to come to the United States to
visit the grave of his parents. At the same time, the Japanese for-
eign minister was preparing to ask President Carter to grant him
full pardon.55 Kawakita's attorney in Los Angeles .was advised in
1979 that "before his client could process a formal petition seeking
the removal of the condition, he would have to convince the De-
partment of Justice that an exception should be made to the policy
against the acceptance of clemency petitions from nonresidents. '5 6
One obvious reason, of course, would be that the terms of his com-
50. Eisenhower Spares Life of U.S. Traitor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1953, at 56.
51. Kawakita, War Criminal, in Tokyo as a Japanese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1963, at 11.
52. Quoted from the clemency warrant (on file with author).
53. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, § 401(h), 54 Stat. 1168, 1169 (1940).
54. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 51, at 11; Kawakita to Get Japan Citizenship, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1963, at 2.
55. Sam Jameson, Deported Traitor Seeks Return to U.S. from Japan, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1978, at 6; Sam Jameson, Help Promised to WWII Traitor, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1978, at 19.
56. Letter from David C. Stephenson, Pardon Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the
author (Aug. 31, 1989)(on file with author).
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muted sentence prohibited not only residence but any return what-
soever. No further appeal or action in his case is on record. As will
be noted below, the constitutionality of the provision under which
Kawakita lost his U.S. citizenship is dubious.
5 7
On November 24, 1952, in Mandoli v. Acheson,58 the Supreme
Court decided another dual-nationality case, on a five-to-four vote.
Justice Jackson, speaking for himself and Justices Frankfurter,
Minton, Black, and Burton,5 9 addressed this question: Does a dual
citizen by birth lose his U.S. citizenship by long-continued foreign
residence after turning twenty-one? Jackson responded in the neg-
ative on the ground that only the 1907 Act was operative in the
case, and that Act imposed no such obligation on a U.S. citizen by
birth to return to this country on coming of age. Jackson went on
to observe that even the 1940 Act did not require such a return of
a dual citizen in Mandoli's situation. He was correct. It only im-
posed return on U.S. citizens (whether by birth or naturalization)
who acquired another nationality by naturalization as minors. No
provision affecting dual nationals by birth was added until 1952.60
Jackson's general conclusion about the 1940 Act that "Con-
gress . . refused to require a citizen by nativity to elect between
dual citizenships upon reaching a majority," 1 is true enough as it
stands, but it contains an implicit fallacy. Namely, Congress did
require dual citizens who acquired their foreign nationality by nat-
uralization to elect between their two citizenships. We have seen
that this was not the case. As was rightly noted by the State De-
partment in 1935, when responding to the consul at Calgary,
"[t]here is no law of this country whereunder a person having dual
nationality may divest himself of one nationality solely through a
process of election."6 A fortiori, there is no law whereunder a dual
national is obligated to divest himself of one nationality by elec-
tion. This was as true after 1940 and after 1952 as it was in 1935,
for the residence requirements of the 1940 and 1952 laws did not
require election between citizenships. A choice in the sense of reaf-
firmation of one's foreign citizenship did not of itself entail loss of
U.S. citizenship, nor did reaffirmation of U.S. citizenship entail
57. Infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
58. 344 U.S. 133 (1952).
59. Justices Douglas, Reed, Clark, and Chief Justice Vinson dissented.
60. Act of June 27, 1952, tit. III, ch. 1, 66 Stat. 235 (1952); infra text accompanying
note 63.
61. 344 U.S. at 138.
62. HACKWORTH, supra note 49, at 357.
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loss or renunciation of the foreign citizenship. To repeat what I
established above, the only requirement of the 1940 law directed at
dual citizens was that dual citizens by naturalization who were liv-
ing abroad had to return to the United States within two years
after attaining majority. The 1952 law extended the time to four
years, and also added a rule that dual citizens by birth could not
live abroad for more than a three-year stretch at any time after
reaching twenty-two.6 3
Justice Douglas dissented in the Mandoli case, but he did not
contest the majority's answer to the question before it. Rather, he
asserted that petitioner Mandoli had lost his citizenship for an-
other reason, namely, for having sworn allegiance to the King of
Italy and serving in the Italian army in 1931, when he was twenty-
three or twenty-four years of age.64 It might seem strange that the
dissent would allow this consideration to be decisive, since it was
not explicitly before the Court; but since the argument was in the
record at a lower level, the justices were within bounds to consider
it. 5 However, the court of appeals in Mandoli, in using similar rea-
soning, was out of bounds according to Jackson." The appellate
court had taken Perkins v. Elg as determining a point that was not
before it. As Jackson says: "That case did not present and the [ap-
pellate court] could not properly have decided any question as to
consequences of a failure to elect American citizenship, for Miss
Elg properly did so elect and decisively evidenced it by resuming
residence here.
'6 7
VI. LOWER-COURT REACTIONS TO MANDOLI IN 1953
The Mandoli ruling had very interesting repercussions in
lower court decisions, resulting in contradictory principles and con-
clusions. I will first take up the case of Gaudio v. Dulles,68 to which
I have already referred. 9 It was heard by Judge Kirkland in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and decided on
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (repealed 1986); supra text accompanying notes 40-42; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (repealed 1978); supra text accompanying notes 43.
64. 344 U.S. at 137-38.
65. See Acheson v. Maenza, 202 F.2d 453, 458 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1953)(referring to Doug-
las's dissenting opinion).
66. 344 U.S. at 138-39.
67. 344 U.S. at 138.
68. 110 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
69. Supra note 9.
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February 19, 1953. It presents the very unusual picture of a lower
federal court accusing the United States Supreme Court of making
an error. Kirkland says:
The Supreme Court erred in its legal premise [in Mandoli]; the
State Department's proposal [in 1940] was accepted by Congress
with only one modification: instead of an immediate election on
reaching majority, the native-born dual national was to have two
years, after the date of reaching majority, within which to make
his choice of allegiance.
70
In fact, however, the Supreme Court made no mistake of law
in its decision. Rather, it is Kirkland who is mistaken, and his er-
rors are multiple. First, he assumes that the 1940 Act applies to all
dual nationals, whereas it only refers to U.S. citizens by birth or
naturalization who acquire another nationality by naturalization.
The Act excludes those who acquire both nationalities by birth.
Second, Kirkland wrongly assumes that the 1940 Act required
the electing of one allegiance and the rejecting of the other;7 1 it
only required a choice of residence. If one were to choose the right
residence, namely, the United States, then, as far as the United
States was concerned, there was no need to choose between
allegiances.
Third, Kirkland compounds his second error by not limiting
the alleged requirement of election to those living abroad; he ex-
tends it in effect even to dual nationals living in the United States.
This is the purport of his bald statement, quoted above, which has
been singled out in the United States Code Annotated.7 2 I will re-
peat it here, so that it can be read in context: "Those individuals
in the status of dual nationals have the duty to make an election
within the reasonable time established by Congress, or accept the
consequences of their passive attitude.
'7 3
Judge Kirkland commits a fourth error in making the follow-
ing statement, which has also been excerpted in the annotated
code: 74 "It was, and still is, the intention [of Congress] that the
plague of 'dual nationality' be eliminated to every degree possi-
70. 110 F. Supp. at 711.
71. As noted above, Jackson in the Mandoli decision seems also to have labored under
this false assumption, but he did not state it explicitly. See supra text accompanying note
61.
72. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. 110 F. Supp. at 710.
74. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1503 n.33 (West 1970).
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ble. ' 76 He adduces as proof of this conclusion, with regard to the
1940 Act, the statements of three members of CongressY However,
these congressmen are specifically referring to "this dual citizen-
ship," meaning that possessed by Americans living permanently in
their other country (and, presumably, those who acquired their
second nationality not by birth but by naturalization)." Kirkland
professed to prove that Congress still had the same intention in
1953 by pointing to the recent passage of the Nationality Act of
1952 and citing a preliminary report stating that "[t]he problem of
dual nationality is one of the most difficult in the nationality
law."' 78 But this statement says nothing about an intention to elim-
inate dual nationality whenever possible. As for the Nationality
Act itself, we have seen that it does not attempt to stamp out dual
nationality, but only to restrict the foreign residence of dual
nationals.
Kirkland's fifth error flows from his first: he assumes that the
plaintiff in his case, a woman named Gaudio, was in the same situ-
ation as Mandoli of Mandoli. But in fact, even if Mandoli had
been subject to the 1940 Act, he would not have been affected by
it; for he had acquired both of his nationalities by birth, whereas
the Act only affected persons like Gaudio, who was a U.S. citizen
by birth but an Italian national by naturalization.
79
Admittedly, Kirkland is correct in recognizing that Gaudio fell
under the 1940 Act. After being born in the United States in 1916,
she was taken to Italy by her parents and naturalized as an Italian.
She obtained a U.S. passport in 1937, before her twenty-first birth-
day, but was unable to return because of illness. The 1940 Act im-
posed an obligation upon dual nationals like her to return to the
United States by January 13, 1943. Judge Kirkland is dismissive of
the excuse that the war prevented such a return, and contemptu-
ous of the excuse that she had trouble making her way to the U.S.
consulate at Naples before June of 1947.80 He attributes her latter-
75. 110 F. Supp. at 709.
76. Id. at 708-09 n.2 (citing Statements of Rep. Poage (Texas), Rep. Mason (Ill.), and
Rep. Dickstein, Chairman (N.Y.) in Hearings on H.R. 6127 Superseded by H.R. 9980 Before
the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1951) [here-
inafter Hearings]).
77. See Hearings, supra note 76, at 320.
78. 110 F. Supp. at 709 (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 87
(1952)).
79. 344 U.S. at 133.
80. 110 F. Supp. at 710.
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day wish to return to the United States solely to a desire to take
advantage of American old-age benefits, like many others "who
have not contributed one iota of assistance to the well being of the
country." 8' Nevertheless, he adjudges her a U.S. citizen because of
Mandoli, and also because of the Acheson v. Maenza case,8 2 which,
he says, "specifically adopted the Supreme Court's language per-
taining to prolonged foreign residence by a dual national and held
such residence 'does not in itself deprive an American citizen of his
citizenship rights.' "Y83
In so saying and acting, however, Judge Kirkland commits a
sixth error. He is mistaken in his characterization of the Maenza
case, in that circuit Judge Clark did not formally adopt the quoted
opinion as his decision; rather, he reported approvingly what he
took to be the sense of the Mandoli case. Clark says that the Su-
preme Court "again emphasized that even extremely prolonged
foreign residence by a dual national, followed by foreign military
service, does not in itself deprive an American citizen of his citi-
zenship rights." " But this was not the basis on which he judged
that Maenza had retained his citizenship. Furthermore, Judge
Clark's characterization of Mandoli is very far off base. Mandoli
made no such general declaration; it only found that one specific
dual national, namely, Mandoli, who was not subject to the 1940 or
1952 laws, did not lose his U.S. citizenship after prolonged foreign
residence. 6
The irony of all this is that, if Judge Kirkland had probed fur-
ther, he could have had his heart's desire and turned Ms. Gaudio
away from the vineyard in which she had not labored, since no
judicial precedent forbade it.
Shortly after the Gaudio decision, in Takehara v. Dulles" the
U.S. Government conceded what it took to be the Mandoli inter-
pretation of the 1940 Act: "that it is not legally required that a
citizen by nativity elect between dual citizenship upon or after
reaching majority. '8 7 That is, the Government agreed that appel-
81. Id.
82. 202 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
83. 110 F. Supp. at 711.
84. 202 F.2d at 458.
85. 344 U.S. at 133.
86. 205 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1953).
87. Id. at 562. As I have noted, this is true enough, since neither the 1940 law nor any
other United States law has ever required any kind of dual citizen to elect between citizen-
ships at maturity or at any other time.
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lant Takehara was not required to choose between his U.S. and
Japanese citizenships. It argued, however, that he was free to make
such an election, and it alleged that he did in fact do so, choosing
Japanese citizenship over U.S., by voting in Japan. 8 Judges Healy
and Pope, forming the majority of the Court, denied the argument,
saying that to effect expatriation the voting would have to be vol-
untary, and in this case it was not.8 9 Judge Bone dissented, holding
that the 1940 law says nothing about the voter's intent.90
Analysis of the Government's argument in Takehara reveals a
very important wrinkle in the myth of election. The Government
drew on the prohibition against voting in a foreign election, which
was one of the provisions of the 1940 Act that did not deal specifi-
cally with dual citizens but rather pertained to the expatriation of
all U.S. citizens, whether single or dual.91 Under this provision, if I
were to vote in a foreign country, I would lose my U.S. citizenship.
If I were originally a dual or multiple citizen, then I would have
one or more citizenships left over when I committed the expatriat-
ing act. If I were only a U.S. citizen, then I would be completely
stateless upon performing the expatriating act.. Now, it would seem
rather silly to say in this latter case that I would have made an
election between being a U.S. citizen and being a citizen of no
country. But it makes no more sense to say in the former case that
I had made an election between citizenships. If I rob a bank and go
to jail as a consequence, I can hardly be said to have elected jail
over remaining free, even though I may have foreseen this result
and therefore deliberately jeopardized my freedom.
The moral, in my view, is that we should not use the term
"election" in expatriation cases. A more general moral is that, be-
cause of the confusion that the word has caused, we should never
speak of election in any of the contexts that we have been discuss-
ing. Rather, we should say what we mean in other words. Thus, if
we are talking about choosing one nationality and repudiating an-
other, we should use "choice between nationalities." If it is a ques-
tion of whether to take up residence in the United States or to
remain abroad, we should speak of a "decision to leave or to stay."
If we are talking about the voluntary renunciation of citizenship,
88. Id. at 562.
89. Id. at 560-62.
90. Id. at 562-66.
91. It was these provisions that Kawakita was appealing to in contending that he had
lost his citizenship. Supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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we should use "expatriation" or "self-expatriation." If we are
speaking of losing citizenship or being deprived of citizenship, we
should use "expatriation," "depatriation," "denaturalization," or
whatever other term is most appropriate.
VII. REPEALS AND AMENDMENTS
As mentioned previously, 8 U.S.C. section 1401(b) (dealing
with citizens born abroad of one American parent) and section
1482 (dealing with dual nationals living abroad after the age of
twenty-two) were repealed in 1978. Section 1481(a)(1) (on natural-
ized duals abroad) was repealed in 1986.92 This left only one sec-
tion of Title 8 specifically pertaining to dual citizens:
1481(a)(4)(A), which I will discuss below."3 Since there is presently
almost no legislative recognition of the status of dual citizens, it is
even more important now than before that we maintain a proper
understanding of the principles set forth in the Kawakita case.
This, especially when contemplating the effects of the 1986 amend-
ments to section 1481 on expatriation. 4
Actions that can cause a person to lose his U.S. citizenship are
now listed in section 1481(a) as follows:
1. "Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state ... after having
attained the age of 18 years."
2. "Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state . . . after having at-
tained the age of 18 years."
3. Serving in the armed forces of a foreign state: (A) hostile to
the United States, or (B) as an officer.
4. (A) "Accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any
office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign
state or a political subdivision thereof after attaining the age of
18 years, if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign
state," or (B) if such service requires an oath or declaration of
allegiance.
5. Formally renouncing U.S. nationality while in a foreign state.
6. Formally renouncing U.S. nationality while in the United
States when the United States is in a state of war.
7. Being convicted of treason, sedition, insurrection, or conspir-
92. Supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
93. Infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
94. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, § 18, 100 Stat. 3655, 3658 (1986) (codified as amended in 8
U.S.C. § 1481 (1988)).
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acy to overthrow the U.S. government.9 5
Three activities formerly in this list but now absent include: (1)
draft evasion by foreign residence (repealed in 1976); (2) being
convicted of desertion from the armed forces during war (repealed
in 1978); and (3) voting in a foreign election (also repealed in
1978). The last-named provision, on voting, was upheld as consti-
tutional by a five-to-four vote in 1958 in Perez v. Brownell,9" and
then declared unconstitutional by a five-to-four vote in 1967 in
Afroyim v. Rusk.9 7 The seventh remaining provision, which in ef-
fect makes loss of citizenship a punishment for treason or sedition,
has an unconstitutional look about it, but it has not yet been
tested. 8 Tomoya Kawakita was deprived of his American citizen-
ship Under the 1940 version of this provision. 9 Note that subsec-
tion 4(A) recognizes the possibility of being a dual national before
the age of eighteen and also of acquiring dual nationality after the
age of eighteen, by virtue of the language, "if he has or acquires
the nationality of such foreign state."'100
Finally, the seven surviving activities named as constituting or
triggering expatriation were completely transformed in the 1986
legislation by the insertion of an extraordinarily important qualifi-
cation: loss of citizenship can occur only "by voluntarily perform-
ing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing
U.S. nationality.'' 101 This amendment was required by previous Su-
preme Court decisions, especially the above-noted Afroyim10 2 and
Vance v. Terrazas.10 3 In the latter case, the Court held unani-
mously that the U.S. Government must prove intent to surrender
U.S. citizenship before loss of citizenship can be established and
enforced.10' The additiori of the proviso to the law gives added pro-
tection to dual nationals who are simply exercising their rights as
citizens of another country; and it also opened the way to allowing
an adult U.S. citizen to acquire another nationality without losing
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(l)-(7) (1988).
96. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
97. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
98. See CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, 4 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 20.10k, at 20-90 (1991).
99. Kawakita, 343 U.S. 717, 721 (1952)(citing 8 U.S.C. § 801); supra text accompanying
notes 49-51.
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A) (1988).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1988).
102. 387 U.S. 253 (1967); supra note 97 and accompanying text.




U.S. citizenship, as is foreseen in subsection 4(A).
VIII. EXERCISING AND ADDING EXTRA NATIONALITIES, 1980-90
In the period after Terrazas (1980), and especially after the
1986 amendments, if one wished to exercise the rights and privi-
leges of a spare nationality, or to add a new nationality, one should
have been prepared to prove, if challenged by the U.S. government
that one did not intend to relinquish U.S. nationality. On the face
of it, this would seem an easy task, since the burden of proof rests
with the government, which would have to show that there is some
advantage to a given person in losing U.S. citizenship and that the
person acted under that motivation. 0 5 It was hard to imagine why
most persons would want to lose U.S. citizenship simply by func-
tioning as a citizen of another country, or by becoming a citizen of
another country, when there was in fact no U.S. law prohibiting
such actions. However, both the government and the judiciary at
various levels had a track record of dislike for dual nationals. 106 It
was therefore deemed only prudent, in advance of taking the con-
templated actions, to prepare proof that there was no intention of
relinquishing U.S. citizenship, and that, on the contrary, there was
every intention of retaining it.10 If one wished to acquire another
nationality, for instance, one should explain to as many potential
court witnesses as possible, both viva voce and currente calamo,
that one had no desire to lose American nationality and no con-
ceivable motive for doing so. Such a state of mind and intention
would be easiest to prove when the oath of allegiance to the foreign
nation contained no repudiation of any other national connection,
as in the oaths of the Australian and New Zealand citizenship acts.
Here is the Australian form: "I, A.B., swear by Almighty God that
I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King
George the Sixth, His heirs and successors according to law, and
that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my
duties as an Australian citizen."' 0 8 But whereas the New Zealand
oath has retained its form (changing, of course, to Queen Elizabeth
the Second), the Australians in 1973 added the phrase, "renounc-
105. GORDON, supra note 44, § 20.9b, at 20-71.
106. Id. § 20.8b(4); see also infra App. I, para. [9].
107. See GORDON, supra note 44, § 20.8b(2), at 20-65.
108. Citizenship Act, 1948, ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF Aus-
TRALIA [AuSTL. ACTS P.] No. 83 (Austl.); cf. Citizenship Act, 1949, STATUTES OF NEW ZEALAND
[N.Z. STAT.] No. 15 sched. 1 (N.Z.).
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ing all other allegiance. "109
A few months after the Terrazas decision, the State Depart-
ment issued a memorandum that contained a list of documents
such as wills, bequests, tax payments, and insurance policies,
which could be cited as indications of intent to retain U.S. citizen-
ship.1 ° Another list, that of actions or indications of intent to re-
linquish citizenship included requesting a visa to enter the United
States, entering the United States on a foreign passport, the exclu-
sive use of a foreign passport, and membership in a political party
in a foreign country."'
In an undated State Department leaflet issued after Terrazas,
but before 1986,112 it is stated: "The issues of intent and voluntari-
ness cannot be resolved until a potentially expatriating act has ac-
tually been performed. Therefore it is not possible to state in ad-
vance that a person will or will not lose U.S. citizenship if that
person becomes a citizen of a foreign country." In addition to list-
ing the paper-trail items noted above, the leaflet notes, "[a] writ-
ten statement submitted to the Embassy or Consulate in advance,
expressing an intent to maintain U.S. citizenship and to continue
to respect the obligation of U.S. citizenship, despite one's plans to
obtain naturalization in a foreign country, would be accorded sub-
stantial weight in a loss of nationality proceeding." It adds,
"[a]lthough personal and financial considerations can occasionally
provide compelling reasons for obtaining foreign citizenshil5, these
reasons do not, in themselves, constitute evidence of intent to re-
tain U.S. citizenship."' 
13
In the early 1980s an academic couple of my acquaintance,
both U.S. citizens but both living and teaching in Canada, were
advised by a Canadian lawyer that they could safely become Cana-
dian citizens without losing their U.S. citizenship by writing a let-
ter such as the leaflet describes and providing details about the
financial benefits Canadian citizenship would give them. The re-
sponse that each received from the Consul read as follows:
I am writing to confirm the Department of State's decision
109. Australian Citizenship Act, 1973, AusTL. ACTS P. No. 99, § 15 sched. 2 (Austl.).
110. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of State, CA/OCS/CCS, A-1767 (Aug. 27, 1980).
111. The complete lists are given by Keelaghan-Silvestre, supra note 21, at 321 nn. 173-
74.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE Loss OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP




to your citizenship status following your naturalization as a Ca-
nadian citizen.
The Department of State has informed this office that the
evidence on record is insufficient to support a holding that you
intended to relinquish your claim to U.S. citizenship by becom-
ing naturalized in Canada. You may therefore continue to be
documented as a U.S. citizen.1 4
This declaration was not phrased in the most reassuring of
terms, and one could well have had the feeling that the State De-
partment was keeping an open file and continuing to amass evi-
dence for loss of citizenship. Such an assumption, however, would
probably have been unfair. In a State Department consular tele-
gram describing the new policy to be discussed in the next section,
there is a rubric, Cases which post has begun to develop involving
the individual's lack of cooperation or indifference,"5 but such
cases involved only instances in which individuals failed to reply to
a questionnaire.' 1 6 As the telegram explains, "[ilt has been our past
practice to regard an individual's silence regarding possible inter-
est in retaining U.S. citizenship as evidence of a person's abandon-
ment of U.S. citizenship.""'  We will now see how it came about
that this practice itself was abandoned.
IX. THE NEW STATE DEPARTMENT PRESUMPTION, APRIL 1990
In 1986, the old provision (c) of section 1481 was retained, but
was relabeled (b)." 8 It notes that there is a presumption of volun-
tariness in the performance of "any act of expatriation under the
provisions of this chapter." 1 9 But none of the acts listed in 1481(a)
constitutes an act of expatriation unless they are done not only
voluntarily but also with the intention of relinquishing U.S. citi-
114. Letter from Frances T. Lide, U.S. Consul at Montreal (Sept. 17, 1985)(on file with
author).
115. Telegram from James Baker, Secretary of State, Unclas State 177856, to the
American Embassy in Canberra and the Consulates in Melbourne, Perth, and Brisbane, and
(for information) to the American Embassies in Wellington, Manila, Seoul, and Tokyo and
the Consulates in Auckland and Hong Kong, § 3 (June 4, 1990) [hereinafter June 1990 Tele-
gram](on file with author).
116. Information for Determination of U.S. Citizenship, in June 1990 Telegram, supra
note 115, § 3 (questionnaire for people seeking U.S. citizenship).
117. June 1990 Telegram, supra note 115, § 3.
118. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, § 19, 100 Stat. 3655, 3658 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §
1481(b) (1988)).
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1988).
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zenship.12 ° Therefore, even though voluntariness may be presumed,
the intention of relinquishing citizenship should not be.
The State Department, however, did not immediately, as a
matter of policy, give the benefit of the doubt to those who per-
formed such acts and assume that they did not intend to give up
U.S. citizenship. Old prejudices, it seems, died hard. But even in
1980 Charles Gordon could write, "The Supreme Court's repeated
bouts with the problem of expatriation have engendered increased
reluctance on the part of courts and administrators to find that
citizenship has been lost, and this reluctance doubtless will con-
tinue."' Before the end of the decade, he added, "Indeed, this
reluctance is underscored in recent administrative decisions, which
generally find that the government has failed to sustain its burden
of establishing that the citizen had intended to relinquish his citi-
zenship." '122 He was particularly impressed with a series of cases
decided in the latter part of 1987 by the State Department Board
of Appellate Review. Two of them dealt with U.S. citizens who be-
came Canadian citizens.12 3 In one case, the evidence cited by the
government for the petitioner's loss of citizenship was, besides his
being naturalized as a Canadian, "non-discharge of civic duties as
U.S. citizen."'2 4 In the other, it was that the petitioner had as-
sumed that in becoming a Canadian he would lose his U.S. citizen-
ship.' In both cases the evidence was rejected as insufficient. The
conclusion in the second case is particularly interesting: "It is not
conceptually inconsistent [for the individual] to assume that he
might have lost citizenship without necessarily willing that re-
sult."1 '' In other words, even if I believe that performing a certain
action will strip me of my U.S. citizenship, I can wish it were not
so; then, according to the law, it is not so. That is, I have not ful-
filled the necessary condition of willingness to relinquish my
citizenship.
Finally, by means of a telegram sent by Secretary of State
James Baker to all diplomatic and consular posts in April 1990, a
"uniform administrative standard of evidence" was established in
120. Id. § 1481(a).
121. GORDON, supra note 44, § 20.8b(1).
122. Id. at 5Q (Supps. 1989, 1990, and 1991).
123. Id. n.55e.1 (citing In re J.J.S., Bd. App. Rev. (Dec. 17, 1987) and In re E.J.P., Bd.
App. Rev. (Oct. 12, 1987)).
124. Id. (citing In re J.J.S., Bd. App. Rev. (Dec. 17, 1987)).
125. Id. (citing In re E.J.P., Bd. App. Rev. (Oct. 12, 1987)).
126. See In re E.J.P., Bd. App Rev. at 12.
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the State Department, which was "based on the premise that
United States nationals intend to keep their U.S. nationality when
they obtain the nationality of another state, make a pro forma dec-
laration of allegiance to another state, or accept a non-policy level
position in another state." '127 This was a revolutionary move, which
completely changed the attitude and methodology of the govern-
ment with regard to loss of nationality. Before this time, the State
Department was processing about 4,500 potential-loss cases each
year, out of which about 800 certificates of loss of nationality were
approved, about 200 of which were based on express renuncia-
tions. 128 Under the new dispensation, when consular posts are noti-
fied by the foreign government that naturalization has occurred,
they will no longer attempt to contact the individuals in question,
or "seek out" possible-loss cases. 129 The number of cases processed
from now on can be expected to be only a small fraction of the
previous rate.
The title of this Article could be taken to imply, with some
room for irony, that the State Department experienced a change of
heart and began to look upon dual nationality with a benign eye,
reversing its previous stance of rather hostile toleration, much as
the Canadian government did in 1976.10 But this is not in fact
what happened. For even though Secretary Baker, in speaking for
the Department, does allege a desire for greater equity in deciding
cases of loss or non-loss of citizenship and does recognize that the
new policy will result in an increase of dual nationality, he indi-
cates that the same unbending attitude towards dual nationality is
to be maintained.' This attitude might be described as "disap-
127. Telegram issued by James Baker, Secretary of State, to all diplomatic and consu-
lar posts, U.S. Dep't of State, Unclas State 121931, § 5 (Apr. 1990)[hereinafter April 1990
Telegram](copy on file with author).
128. Id. § 9.
129. June 1990 Telegram, supra note 115, § 2 (referring specifically to notifications by
the Australian government of U.S. citizens nationalized as Australians). The new policy was
brought to the attention of the legal community by Carmen DiPlacido in an address deliv-
ered on June 8, 1990 at the American Immigration Lawyers Annual Conference in Seattle.
See Moira Farrow, New Rules Allow Dual Citizenship for Americans Abroad, VANCOUVER
SUN, July 6, 1990, at 12; Terry T. Preshaw & Roberta K. Shapiro, To Be or Not to Be: The
Dual Citizen's Dilemma, 48 THE ADvOCATE 711-16 (Sept. 1990). The new policy had appar-
ently not filtered through the U.S. Embassy in Paris by the beginning of 1991. Andrew D.
Stewart & Siegfried Kurz, Dual Nationality: Etes-Vous Francais ?, ARMY LAW. 3-6 (Mar.
1991).
130. See R. A. Gould, Multiple or Dual Nationality Under Canadian Law, 57 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 556-62 (1980).
131. See April 1990 Telegram, supra note 127, § 9.
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proval on philosophical and practical grounds," or as the State De-
partment leaflet Dual Nationality puts it, "While recognizing the
existence of dual nationality and permitting Americans to have
other nationalities, the U.S. Government does not endorse dual na-
tionality as a matter of policy because of the problems which it
may cause. ' 132 Secretary Baker puts it thus:
This action should not be seen as an endorsement of dual na-
tionality. Our obligation is to ensure that the administration of
our laws is equitable and consistent, regardless of the fact that
dual nationality may be an incidental product of that treatment.
The adoption of this administrative standard is consistent with
our resolve to continue to meet our statutory obligation to deter-
mine whether loss has occurred by ascertaining the citizen's
intent. 13
There was a practical as well as theoretical reason for adopting
the new standard: the workload in processing cases under the old
assumption was becoming too great. As Baker notes,
Changes in interpretation of citizenship law have made cases
progressively more difficult to manage. In a given case, the facts
may yield a number of different interpretations, or leave consci-
entious officers in the field and at the Department unsure of
whether the facts fall just short of or just beyond the applicable
standards. The officer reviewing the case, however, is left with a
simple and uncompromising choice: loss or retention of Ameri-
can citizenship. In the past, we have responded to this challenge
with more officer time, closer supervision, and extra training. At
this point, however, we must look to substantial changes in the
process if we are to provide equitable, timely, and defensible
decisions.
13 4
The final form of the new policy was embodied in a telegram
sent in October of 1990135 and in a revision of the leaflet designed
for general distribution.' The "acts of expatriation" listed in the
section 1481(a)' 37 are now referred to in the new leaflet as only
"potentially" expatriating. The first two provisions, concerning for-
132. See infra App. .1, para. [9].
133. April 1990 Telegram, supra note 127, § 9.
134. Id. § 4.
135. Telegram from James Baker, Secretary of State, Unclas State 349075, to all diplo-
matic and consular posts (Oct. 1990)(copy on file with author).
136. Infra App. II (reprint of U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE
Loss OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL NATIONALITY (revised ed. circa Oct. 1990).
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1986).
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eign naturalization and oaths, have been almost eliminated from
consideration, while the fourth, concerning employment in a for-
eign government, has been qualified. 3 8 The official leaflet states:
In light of the administrative premise discussed above, a person
who:
(1) is naturalized in a foreign country;
(2) takes a routine oath of allegiance; or
(3) accepts non-policy level employment with a foreign
government
and in so doing wishes to retain U.S. citizenship need not sub-
mit prior to the commission of a potentially expatriating act a
statement or evidence of his or her intent to retain U.S. citizen-
ship since such an intent will be presumed. 3 '
However, the text goes on to say that when "such cases" come to
the attention of a consular officer, the person in question will be
asked to complete a questionnaire, "to ascertain his or her intent
toward U.S. citizenship." Citizenship will be declared retained un-
less the person states a contrary intent."'
Where does this leave the sort of naturalization oath, like the
Australian form noted above,' which includes a clause renouncing
all other allegiances? In 1987, Charles and Gittel Gordon warned,
"Absent highly unusual circumstances, it is virtually impossible to
show an intent not to lose citizenship in the face of a renunciation
oath."' 2 Are such oaths now classified as routine? The answer is
yes. I am assured by the Office of Citizens Consular Services that
formulas of renunciation contained in naturalization oaths are now
considered merely pro forma declarations, without any indication
of intention to give up U.S. citizenship.'
4 3
The leaflet does not specifically relate the third and sixth (po-
tentially) expatriating acts listed in section 1481(a) 44 to this new
138. See infra App. II.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Supra note 109 and accompanying text.
142. CHARLES GORDON & GITTEL GORDON, 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 67.12[1][b][ii], at 67-60 (1987).
143. Telephone conversation with Carmen DiPlacido, director, Office of Consular Ser-
vices, U.S. Dep't of State (July 18, 1991). This policy is confirmed for Australia in Baker's
June 1990 Telegram, supra notes 115, 129.
144. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(3) (regarding serving in the armed forces of a foreign country),




administrative directive. But it specifically withholds its favorable
premise from the fifth provision,145 the seventh provision," 6 and a
version of the fourth provision. 14 7 That is, in these cases, there is
no presumption against intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship. This
is not quite the same as saying that there is a presumption of such
intent, although it is in fact presumed in the first case (making a
formal renunciation outside the United States). But even here, one
could easily imagine that no real desire of relinquishment might
exist. Foreign work requirements or pressures could drive a person
to make a formal renunciation of U.S. citizenship, albeit with re-
luctance. In the other two situations (conviction of treason and
high-level service in a foreign government), the State Department
will investigate each individual instance carefully to determine in-
tent. In both cases, circumstances are likely to vary widely. One
could commit treason solely for financial gain, with no accompany-
ing intention to lose U.S. citizenship. Even more understandably,
one could work at a high level of a foreign government, even serv-
ing as head of state, without wanting to relinquish one's U.S. na-
tionality. The recent appointment of Raffi Hovannisian as foreign
minister of Armenia is a case in point. He has stated publicly, "I
certainly do not renounce my American citizenship, and I do not
foresee any problem.""11
8
The State Department leaflet goes on to note that the seven
statutory actions listed as potentially expatriating are not eligible
for the administrative premise against relinquishment if "accom-
panied by conduct which is so inconsistent with retention of U.S.
citizenship that it compels a conclusion that the individual in-
tended to relinquish U.S. citizenship."" 9 Such cases, which are ad-
mitted to be very rare, would come even closer to an opposite pre-
sumption-in favor of intent to relinquish-especially if they
involve one of the three actions already withheld from the admin-
istrative directive. 50
145. Id. § 1481(a)(5) (addressing formal renunciation outside the United States).
146. Id. § 1481(a)(7)(conviction of treason or of sedition or conspiring to overthrow the
government).
147. Id. § 1481(a)(4)(working for a foreign government). The leaflet withholds favorable
presumption from those who accept a policy-level position with a foreign government. Infra
App. II.
148. Mathis Chazonov, Job Springs from Ethnic Roots, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at 8
(Westside ed.).
149. Infra App. II.
150. See supra notes 145-47.
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Finally, the leaflet notes that persons who have previously lost
their U.S. citizenship can have their cases reconsidered in light of
the new administrative premise151
X. RENUNCIATION OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE QUESTION OF PERJURY
The new State Department policy not only allows an adult
U.S. citizen to acquire citizenship in countries that require natural-
ized citizens to renounce other allegiances. It also permits minors
who are citizens of the United States and of another country which
does not allow dual nationality to adults to take the oath renounc-
ing U.S. citizenship without in fact suffering loss of U.S. citizen-
ship or endangering it. But where does that leave the question of
perjury, both in the forum of conscience and in the tribunals of the
country requiring the oaths of renunciation?
The United States requires a declaration of renunciation from
adults becoming naturalized as U.S. citizens, including those who
know that their renunciation will not in fact cause the loss of their
present citizenships. Mexico is an example of a country that has a
law against dual nationality for adults; it was the precipitating fac-
tor in the Terrazas case. 152 Mexico requires those who wish to re-
tain Mexican citizenship after reaching adulthood to obtain a cer-
tificate of Mexican nationality, which includes a declaration
renouncing any other citizenship.1 53 Italian law since 1983 provides
another example: in the case of double citizenship, the child must
choose only one citizenship within a year after reaching
151. Infra App. II.
152. 444 U.S. 252; supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
153. This was the law beginning in 1949. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809,
817 (2d Cir. 1976). In this case, Dorothy Burns, n~e Gould, became a Mexican citizen by
marriage in 1944, and claimed that she had thereby lost U.S. citizenship and that her estate
was not subject to U.S. taxes. Id. The court, however, ruled that she had not relinquished
her U.S. citizenship. Id. However, in Vance v. Terrazas, Laurence Terrazas desired to retain
his citizenship, and it was denied on remarkably slender grounds. 444 U.S. 252. He was a
dual national by birth, having been born in the United States of a Mexican father. Id. at
255. When he was 22, he needed a certificate of Mexican citizenship in order to receive his
college degree. Id. The standard form for such certificates contains a renunciation clause,
with blanks to be filled by naming any other allegiances that the applicants might have. Id.
n.2. After a number of appeals and a remand by the Supreme Court, the U.S. government
was victorious in its claim that Terrazas had renounced his U.S. citizenship in applying for
and receiving such a certificate, even though he had not personally signed any document; it
had all been done through political influence. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981).
His citizenship was later restored extrajudicially. Telephone Conversation with Kenneth




The Italian law does not provide a formula for making such a
choice. If, however, it were like the one that I was 'given orally by
the Italian Consulate in Los Angeles, namely, "I elect Italian citi-
zenship over all other allegiances, ' 55 such a declaration, before the
administrative directive of 1990, would result in loss of ,U.S. citi-
zenship only if and when the government could prove that it was
done with the intention of relinquishing citizenship. In other
words, the reported Italian formula falls considerably short of a
formal renunciation of other allegiances. Conceivably, one could in-
tend to value Italian allegiance somewhat more than U.S. alle-
giance, without intending to repudiate or relinquish the latter. The
State Department leaflet on dual nationality recognizes the con-
cept of greater and lesser allegiance when it says: "It generally is
considered that while dual nationals are in the other country of
which they are citizens that country has a predominant claim on
them.""'6
Can one go further and argue that a genuine renunciation of
allegiance can be made without intending to relinquish citizen-
ship? I have heard this distinction made by a person who took U.S.
citizenship and, as required by section 1448 of the Nationality Act,
swore "to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all alle-
154. Law No. 112 of Apr. 26, 1983, Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gaz.
Uff.] 3149 (Ital.)("Nel caso di doppia cittadinanza, il figlio dovrb optare per una sola cit-
tadinanza entro un anno dal raggiungimento della maggiore etb."). The law also provides
for the first time that mothers as well as fathers can pass on Italian citizenship. For older
Italian law, see Nationality Act of June 13, 1912, art. 7 (U.N. Secretariat trans.) reprinted in
U.N. LEGIS. SERIES, LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, at 267-71, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/4,
U.N. Sales No. 1954.V.1 (1954)("An Italian citizen who was born and is resident in a foreign
country in which he is treated as a citizen of that country by birth, shall nevertheless retain
Italian citizenship unless he renounces Italian citizenship on attaining the age of majority or
on becoming sui juris."). The last clause of article 7 does not do justice to the original
Italian, which reads, "ma, divenuto maggiorenne o emancipato, pu6 rinunciarvi," meaning
"but, on becoming of age or legally independent, he can renounce it." I CINQUE CODici 498-9
(Rosario Nicol& & Giovanni Leone eds., 1967). Since I am writing on the myth of election, I
should note for the record that after being initially informed by the Italian Consulate in Los
Angeles that an election was necessary between the ages of 18 and 19, I was assured by the
San Francisco Consulate that this was not the case. Telephone Conversation with the Italian
Consulate in Los Angeles (July 11, 1989); Telephone Conversation with the San Francisco
Consulate (July 27, 1989). At first, I tended to believe that the Los Angeles office was in-
dulging in a myth of election, until the Los Angeles Consul General sent me a copy of the
1983 legislation. It turns out that the San Francisco branch was operating under the older
law, which had been superseded.
155. Telephone Conversation with the Italian Consulate in Los Angeles (July 11, 1989);
see supra note 154.
156. Infra, App. I, para. [10].
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giance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sover-
eignty of whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citi-
zen," 1 7 while intending to keep his other citizenship (and knowing
that his native government would not deprive him of it). Irrespec-
tive of the mental distinctions or reservations maintained by for-
eign nationals who swear the American formula while intending to
remain loyal to their present nationality, the U.S. government, to
my knowledge, has refrained from prosecuting any such persons
for taking the oath in bad faith. Two reasons may explain the gov-
ernment's relaxed position: (1) without documentary proof, such
bad faith would be hard to prove, and (2) even if sincerely in-
tended, the oath would not have the desired effect of eliminating
the other citizenship. Other countries may not be so benign.
In In re T.G.E.,158 decided by the State Department Board of
Appellate Review, a seventeen-year-old dual national informed the
U.S. Embassy in Mexico-four months before turning eighteen and
executing the required declaration of allegiance to Mexico (which
requires renunciation of U.S. citizenship)-that he wished to retain
U.S. citizenship. His U.S. citizenship was judged to be not relin-
quished. However, another dual national, M.P.G. in a case decided
two months later," 9 was adjudged to have lost her U.S. citizenship
when she executed a similar declaration of allegiance (and renunci-
ation) in order to obtain a Mexican passport.'"0 These cases are
reconcilable, however, on the basis that T.G.E. had informed the
U.S. government of his full intentions beforehand, whereas M.P.G.
did not. As Gordon stated in 1989:
A citizen who contemplates taking some action which could be
considered an act of expatriation can protect his citizenship sta-
tus by actions which will confirm his continuing intent to retain
U.S. citizenship. This could include a contemporary written
statement describing the reasons for his action and his desire to
retain U.S. citizenship, submitted to the American consul or the
Department of State, to be included in their files. 6 '
T.G.E. acted properly, as far as the U.S. government was con-
cerned, when leaving a documentary record of his intention to
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (1986).
158. Bd. App. Rev. (Oct. 23, 1987)(cited in GORDON, supra note 44, § 20.8b, at 50
n.55e.1 (Supp. 1991)).
159. In re M.P.G., Bd. App. Rev. (Dec. 31, 1987)(cited in GORDON, supra note 44, at 50
n.e.1 (Supp. 1991)).
160. Id.
161. GORDON, supra note 44, § 20.9b, at 50 (Supps. 1989, 1990, and 1991).
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withhold consent when renouncing his U.S. citizenship. However, if
such a record were to come to the attention of the Mexican govern-
ment, he would doubtless not only lose his Mexican citizenship but
also be subject to prosecution for taking a false oath.
Today, M.P.G.'s case would not even be considered by U.S.
field officers as a possibility for loss of citizenship because of the
new administrative premise. Were M.P.G. to apply for restoration
of citizenship, it would be routinely granted.
Under Australian law, if an adult Australian wished to obtain
another nationality, no mental reservation would help. An Austra-
lian citizen who accepts naturalization in a foreign country,
whether or not there is a renunciation clause, automatically ceases
to be an Australian citizen."6 2 The operation of the Australian Act
is much like the principle of excommunicatio latae sententiae in
canon law: excommunication occurs as soon as the prohibited ac-
tion is committed, because sentence has already been passed. In
contrast, New Zealand law resembles excommunicatio ferendae
sententiae, where one must be convicted and sentenced in court
for the censure to take effect. 163 According to section 22 of New
Zealand's Citizenship Act, "[t]he Minister may by order deprive
any person of his New Zealand citizenship" for acquiring another
nationality, if it is thought "not conducive to the public good that
he should continue to be a New Zealand citizen."1" 4 I am told that
it is current administrative practice not to exercise this option of
deprivation, and that New Zealanders are freely permitted and
even encouraged to acquire new nationalities without fear of losing
their native citizenship. 1 5
XI. KELLY FAMILY EXAMPLES
I will now draw some practical conclusions from the above sur-
162. Citizenship Act, 1948, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 83, § 17 (Austl.). The Australian law on
dual citizenship is contained in section 18: a person who is a dual citizen before the age of
eighteen (or before the age of twenty-one if born before 1973) may at the age of eighteen (or
twenty-one) renounce Australian citizenship. In other words, it is not possible for a dual
citizen to expatriate himself before the stipulated age; it is possible thereafter, but, of
course, not required. Furthermore, there is no requirement to renounce one's other
citizenship.
163. Citizenship Act, 1977, N.Z. STAT. § 22 (N.Z.).
164. Id.
165. I have been assured that this is the situation by a New Zealander who has become
a U.S. citizen but who still retains his New Zealand citizenship and is periodically retained
for consultations by the New Zealand government.
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vey of rules and laws of various countries, using my own family as
examples.
1. Ansgar Kelly, born in Iowa in 1934; mother, Inez Anderson,
daughter of Swedish immigrants; father, Harry Kelly, whose fa-
ther, Patrick Kelly, was born in County Sligo, Ireland, in 1851.
Having Swedish grandparents has no effect on my status; but a
1956 statute of the Republic of Ireland made an Irish citizen out of
anyone born before 1956 who had a grandparent born in Ireland.""
If I had registered as a citizen before 1986, my children would have
been great-grandfathered in as citizens. I am still entitled to regis-
ter as a citizen and to apply for an Irish passport. Nothing in U.S.
law would prevent such actions or jeopardize my U.S. citizenship,
as is made clear in a flyer to this effect issued by the State Depart-
ment.'67 However, one should remember that acquisition of citizen-
ship in another country may also bring new tax obligations as well
as potential estate claims.
As noted below, my wife Marea is Australian, and if we were
to go to Australia to live, I would be interested in being naturalized
as an Australian citizen, if it could be done without losing my U.S.
citizenship. Before 1990, this would have been difficult, since the
current Australian naturalization oath, in force since 1973, includes
a renunciation of all other allegiance. 6 " I would have needed to
convince both Australian and American authorities, and myself,
that I could take, and actually did take, the oath and really mean
it, but without intending to relinquish U.S. citizenship. Since 1990,
there is no longer a problem from the side of the U.S. government.
I doubt that a fine distinction between allegiance and nationality
would be found acceptable to the Australian government; but as
for myself, my training as a former Jesuit in the science of casu-
istry (that is, drawing fine lines in cases of conscience) would en-
able me to swear in good faith to renounce all other allegiances
(with the qualification, sotto voce, "insofar as any such allegiances
are incompatible with my being a good Australian citizen").
2. Marea Kelly, wife of Ansgar, born in Sydney, Australia, in
166. See J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 40 (2d ed. 1984). Other countries that
extend citizenship abroad beyond the second generation are Great Britain and, since 1976,
Canada. For the former, see NissIM BAR-YAAKOV, DUAL NATIONALITY 26 (1961), and for the
latter, R.A. Gould, supra, note 130.
167. Infra App. III (reprint of an untitled and undated flyer from the U.S. Dep't of
State on Irish citizenship)(copy on file with author).
168. Australian Citizenship Act, 1973, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 99, § 15 sched. 2 (Austl.);
supra text accompanying note 109.
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1938. Her father, Arnold Tancred, was born in 1904, the son of
Thomas Tancred, who was born in the California gold fields in
1852 of Irish-Australian parents and taken to Sydney as an infant.
Thomas, therefore, was a U.S. citizen by "soil," that is, de jure
soli, and remained so until he died in 1932. Arnold and his four-
teen brothers and sisters were U.S. citizens by blood, de jure
sanguinis paterni, because their father was American by birth and
resided, however briefly, in the United States, thus fulfilling the
requirements of the 1855 Act.169 Arnold and his siblings lost their
right to U.S. protection by not fulfilling the requirements of the
1907 Expatriation Act1 70 when they turned eighteen and twenty-
one. However, they did not lose U.S. citizenship by operation of
law until 1955, when they failed to take up residence in the United
States as required by section 1482 of the Nationality Act of
1952.1 Those who were still alive in 1978 regained their citizen-
ship when this provision was repealed. Marea, however, is not a
U.S. citizen, even though she is the daughter of a citizen-by-birth,
because Arnold had never resided in the United States. If she, as
an Australian citizen living in the United States on a green card,
were to be naturalized as a U.S. citizen (which she has no intention
of doing), she would ipso facto lose her Australian citizenship by
operation of Australian law. This would be the case even if the
American oath of allegiance did not contain a renunciation of all
other allegiance.
3. Sarah Kelly, born in Los Angeles in 1970, daughter of An-
sgar and Marea. By jus soli and jus sanguinis paterni she was au-
tomatically a U.S. citizen, and since Australia in 1969 allowed Aus-
tralian citizenship to be passed on by women, she also had the
right to be registered as an Australian citizen de jure sanguinis
materni. She was registered as such soon after birth. We were told
by officials of both countries that at the age of eighteen she would
have to elect one citizenship and give up the other. At first, she
was added to the passports of both Marea and me, and eventually
she obtained her own U.S. and Australian passports. When she
turned eighteen, she did not go through a ritual of election or re-
nunciation. When she applied to renew her Australian passport at
the age of nineteen in 1989, she stated, as required on the form,
that she also held U.S. citizenship. The new passport was issued
169. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604 (1855).
170. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (repealed 1940).
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (repealed by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978)).
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without incident, and she completed a semester at the University
of New South Wales in Sydney as an Australian citizen, without
having to pay foreign fees.
Just before her return to the United States in August of 1990,
Sarah renewed her U.S. passport at the U.S. consulate in Sydney,
where no objection was made to her holding an Australian passport
as well; but she was held up by an official in passport control at the
airport, who told her that she needed a visa to enter the United
States. When she replied that she did not need a visa because she
had a U.S. passport, he declared that it was illegal to hold both
passports. She, however, snatching the Australian passport from
his hand and strongly asserting that it was legal, passed through
the gate without waiting for his reply. He was sufficiently dumb-
founded-and, no doubt, uncertain of his position-that he made
no effort to stop her.
As far as the current laws of both countries are concerned, Sa-
rah will always be able to renew both passports; and she should be
able to exercise normal rights and duties in both homelands with-
out jeopardizing either citizenship, if she takes the proper
precautions.
4. Dominic Kelly, born in 1972 in Rome, son of Ansgar and
Marea, had the right to be registered as a U.S. citizen because of
sanguis paternus and as an Australian citizen by sanguis
maternus. We immediately registered him as a U.S. citizen, but as
time went on we were not able to recall whether we had done the
same for the Australian side, since we were not able to find his
certificate of registration. According to section 11 of the Australian
Citizenship Act, a child born of an Australian parent outside Aus-
tralia must be registered as a citizen within five years of birth or
within such further period as the Minister allows.' The current
policy, as stated on the registration form and accompanying leaflet,
is that registration must take place before one's eighteenth birth-
day.173 Dominic had an Australian passport, which was scheduled
to expire in September 1989. According to the renewal instruc-
tions, he would have been able to get a new one simply by produc-
ing the expired passport, which also would have served as proof of
citizenship. Nevertheless, as a matter of caution, we had his
records searched at Canberra to see if he had been registered in
172. Australian Citizenship Act, 1973, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 99, § 11 (Austl.).
173. Copies on file with author.
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1972, with the help of the Australian consulate in Los Angeles.174
We were prepared to register him before he reached the cut-off
age, but it turned out that he was indeed already registered; his
passport was subsequently renewed. When he turned eighteen on
June 2, 1990, he refrained from exercising his right as an adult to
repudiate his U.S. citizenship. Like Sarah, he will always be able to
keep and exercise both U.S. and Australian citizenships. As for
Italian citizenship, at the time that he was born it came only by
way of paternal blood; maternal blood became a basis in 1983,175
but at the same time the possibility of retaining Italian citizenship
and some other nationality after reaching nineteen was removed. 176
Therefore, even if jus soli had been added as a third way of be-
coming an Italian citizen, Dominic would not have been able to
take advantage of it without renouncing his other two nationalities,
or at least giving them second preference to Italian. In doing so, no
matter what the formula, he would not have lost or endangered his
U.S. citizenship, since a couple of months before he turned eigh-
teen the State Department decided that such renunciations were
merely pro forma, and constituted no presumption of intention to
relinquish citizenship. Similarly, his Australian citizenship would
probably not have been lost, since the Australian law provides for
loss of citizenship only by acquiring another nationality, not by re-
taining one already possessed, and specifies that anyone born
before 1973, like Dominic, cannot renounce Australian citizenship
before reaching twenty-one.
177
XII. CONCLUSION: DEALING WITH ANTI-DUALISM
Dual nationality has always been permitted in this country,
and there has never been a law requiring persons with more than
one citizenship to elect one and repudiate the other(s). But the
mind-set that there was, and is, such a "principle of election" has
infected the judgment of the populace in general, including many
persons in public service, public office, and the judiciary. One up-
shot is that laws dealing with quite different matters have been
misread as mandating such an election. Thus, the requirement for
certain kinds of dual nationals living abroad to take up residence
174. All such records are kept at the seat of the Australian federal government in Can-
berra, ACT (Australia Capital Territory).
175. See supra note 154.
176. Id.
177. Australian Citizenship Act, 1973, AUSTL. AcTs P. No. 83 § 18 (Austl.)
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in the United States was mistakenly read as a demand that all
dual nationals must choose to be only an American and renounce
their other nationality, or vice versa. Doubtless the fact that some
countries do demand such a decision of dual nationals (we have
seen the examples of Mexico and Italy) has added to the belief
that the same is true of the United States. Again, U.S. laws listing
actions that can cause any U.S. citizens, including those who are
not dual nationals, to lose their U.S. citizenship have been mistak-
enly transmuted into a doctrine of election between nationalities in
those cases where persons do in fact have citizenship both in the
United States and in another country. Finally, the fact that United
States law in the past has prohibited adult U.S. citizens from ac-
quiring another nationality without losing U.S. citizenship has con-
tributed to the idea that no adult American is allowed to retain
another citizenship.
As a result, one is very likely to find persons ignorant of the
law working in consulates and passport agencies, both foreign and
domestic, who are true believers in the false doctrine of election. It
may very well be true, then, what a staffperson at the Australian
consulate in Los Angeles told me, that U.S. officials have insisted
that dual nationals give up their foreign citizenship; and it may
also be true what another former employee of the Australian con-
sulate said about Australian officials in the past insisting that dual
citizens of Australia and the U.S. must surrender their U.S. pass-
ports. If so, however, they would have been acting contrary to the
law, or, as one of the judges cited above put it, "under a mistake of
law. 178 The best defense against such illegal encroachments upon
one's rights is to bring along copies of the relevant laws and poli-
cies-and specifically, where U.S. law is concerned, to have at the
ready the State Department leaflet on dual nationality.
17 9
As I noted at the beginning of this Article, I think that the
State Department is overreading the law in saying that all U.S.
entries and exits are to be on U.S. passports. But it would be
senseless to seek confrontation when there is no need. One should
therefore always have both (or all) of one's passports available for
inspection, but one should vehemently object to any attempt to
confiscate a passport. All dual citizens should firmly insist on their
rights, and, if these rights are threatened in some diplomatic out-
178. Rueff v. Brownell, 116 F. Supp. 298, 306 (1953)(Judge Smith); see supra note 49.
179. Infra. App. I.
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post, they should immediately telephone the State Department.
One should ask for the person in charge of the other country of
which one is a citizen.80 In my first attempt to get information
from the State Department, the person at the front desk gave me
the wrong answer. The wrong answer, needless to say, was nothing




[1] Dual nationality is the simultaneous possession of two citizen-
ships. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
dual nationality is "a status long recognized in the law" and that
"a person may have and exercise rights of nationality in two coun-
tries and be subject to the responsibilities of both. The mere fact
that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not without more
mean that he renounces the other," Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717
(1952). The concepts discussed in this leaflet apply also to persons
who have more than two nationalities.
How Acquired
[2] Dual nationality results from the fact that there is no uniform
rule of international law relating to the acquisition of nationality.
Each country has its own laws on the subject, and its nationality is
conferred upon individuals on the basis of its own independent do-
180. The phone numbers of the various desks of the Overseas Citizens Services are
given at the end of App. II, infra.
181. This appendix is a current edition of U.S. DEP'T OF STATE LEAFLET, DUAL NATION-
ALITY. I have seen four versions of this leaflet, all undated:
A. Short version, dating from between the Terrazas decision of 1980 and the
1986 legislation on nationality. It lacks the subheadings, paragraphs 5, 12, 13,
and 14, and most of the references to Supreme Court decisions. It also lacks the
first and last sentences of paragraph 1, while the rest of paragraph 1 occurs in
the place of the current paragraph 5. It also has a different conclusion to para-
graph 7, as noted in the text.
B. Short version, dating from after 1986 and before 1990. Like A, but with
current paragraph 5.
C. Long version, like B, but containing also paragraphs 1, 12, 13, and 14.
D. Long version, dating from around October 1990. Like C, but containing
revised paragraph 7.
The text above follows D, but with the paragraph divisions of C. I have added the
paragraph numbers and other bracketed matter.
1991-92]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
mestic policy. Individuals may have dual nationality not by choice
but by automatic operation of these different and sometimes con-
flicting laws.
[3] The laws of the United States, no less than those of other coun-
tries, contribute to the situation because they provide for acquisi-
tion of U.S. citizenship by birth in the United States and also by
birth abroad to an American, regardless of the other nationalities
which a person might acquire at birth. For example, a child born
abroad to U.S. citizens may acquire at birth not only American
citizenship but also the nationality of the country in which it was
born. Similarly, a child born in the United States to foreigners may
acquire at birth both U.S. citizenship and a foreign nationality.
[4] The laws of some countries provide for automatic acquisition of
citizenship after birth, for example, by marriage. In addition, some
countries do not recognize naturalization in a foreign state as
grounds for loss of citizenship. A person from one of those coun-
tries who is naturalized in the United States keeps the nationality
of the country of origin despite the fact that one of the require-
ments of U.S. naturalization is a renunciation of other
nationalities.
Current Law and Policy
[5] The current nationality laws of the United States do not specif-
ically refer to dual nationality. [Added after 1986. There is, how-
ever, still a reference to dual nationality in U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A),
as noted in Parts II and VII of the above Article.]
[6] The automatic acquisition or retention of a foreign nationality
does not affect U.S. citizenship; however, the acquisition of a for-
eign nationality upon one's own application or the application of a
duly authorized agent may cause loss of U.S. citizenship under
Section 349(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(1)].
[7] In order for loss of nationality to occur under Section 349(a)(1),
it must be established that the naturalization was obtained volun-
tarily by a person eighteen years of age or older with the intention
of relinquishing U.S. citizenship. Such an intention may be shown
by the person's statements or conduct, Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252 (1980), but in most cases it is assumed that Americans who are
naturalized in other countries intend to keep their U.S. citizenship.
As a result, they have both nationalities. [This is the text since
1990. Previously, after the citation of the 1980 Supreme Court
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case, Terrazas, the text read: "If the U.S. Government is unable to
prove that the person had such an intention when applying for and
obtaining the foreign citizenship, the person will have both
nationalities."]
[8] United States law does not contain any provisions requiring
U.S. citizens who are born with dual nationality to choose one na-
tionality or the other when they become adults, Mandoli v. Ache-
son, 344 U.S. 133 (1952).
[9] While recognizing the existence of dual nationality and permit-
ting Americans to have other nationalities, the U.S. government
does not endorse dual nationality as a matter of policy because of
the problems which it may cause. Claims of other countries upon
dual-national U.S. citizens often place them in situations where
their obligations to one country are in conflict with the laws of the
other. In addition, their dual nationality may hamper efforts to
provide diplomatic and consular protection to them when they are
abroad.
Allegiance to Which Country
[10] It generally is considered that while dual nationals are in the
other country of which they are citizens that country has a pre-
dominant claim on them.
[11] Like Americans who possess only U.S. citizenship, dual na-
tional U.S. citizens owe allegiance to the United States and are
obliged to obey its laws and regulations. Such persons usually have
certain obligations to the foreign country as well. Although failure
to fulfill such obligations may have no adverse effect on dual na-
tionals while in the United States because the foreign country
would have few means to force compliance under those circum-
stances, dual nationals might be forced to comply with those obli-
gations or pay a penalty if they go to the foreign country. In cases
where dual nationals encounter difficulty in a foreign country of
which they are citizens, the ability of U.S. Foreign Service posts to
provide assistance may be quite limited since many foreign coun-
tries may not recognize a dual national's claim to U.S. citizenship.
Which Passport to Use
[12] Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.
§ 1185] requires U.S. citizens to use U.S. passports when entering
or leaving the United States unless one of the exceptions listed in
Section 53.2 of Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations applies.
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Dual nationals may be required by the other country of which they
are citizens to enter and leave that country using its passport, but
do not endanger their U.S. citizenship by complying with such a
requirement. [See Part II of the above Article for an argument that
dual nationals do not need to use U.S. passports when leaving the
United States, but may fulfill the law by using a valid passport
from another country.]
How to Give Up Dual Nationality
[13] Most countries have laws which specify how a citizen may lose
or divest citizenship. Generally, persons who do not wish to main-
tain dual nationality may renounce the citizenship which they do
not want. Information on renouncing a foreign nationality may be
obtained from the foreign country's Embassies and Consulates or
from the appropriate governmental agency in that country. Ameri-
cans may renounce their U.S. citizenship abroad pursuant to Sec-
tion 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(5)]' Information on renouncing U.S. citizenship may be
obtained from U.S. Embassies and Consulates and the Office of
Citizens Consular Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
[14] For further information on dual nationality, see Marjorie M.
Whiteman's Digest of International Law (Department of State
Publication 8290, released September 1967), volume 8, pages 64-84.
APPENDIX 11182
ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE Loss OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL
NATIONALITY
The Department of State is responsible for determining the
citizenship status of a person located outside the United States or
in connection with the application for a U.S. passport while in the
United States.
182. This appendix is a reprint of U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LEAFLET, ADVICE ABOUT POSSi-
BLE Loss OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL NATIONALITY. The leaflet is undated but was com-
piled around October 1990; it explains the change of policy introduced in April 1990. I have




Section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended [8 U.S.C. § 1481], states that U.S. citizens are subject to
loss of citizenship if they perform certain acts voluntarily and with
the intention to relinquish U.S. citizenship. Briefly stated, these
acts include:
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state (Sec. 349(a)(1)
INA [8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)]);
(2) taking an oath, affirmation, or other formal declaration to a
foreign state or its political subdivisions (Sec. 349(a)(2) INA [8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1)]);
(3) entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state
engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or serving as a commissioned
or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces of a foreign state
(Sec. 349(a)(3) INA [8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3)]);
(4) accepting employment with a foreign government if (a) one
has the nationality of that foreign state or (b) a declaration of alle-
giance is required in acce~iting the position (Sec. 349(a)(4) INA [8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)]);
(5) formally renouncing U.S. citizenship before a U.S. consular
officer outside the United States (Sec. 349(a)(5) INA [8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a)(5)]);
(6) formally renouncing U.S. citizenship within the U.S. (but
only "in time of war") (Sec. 349(a)(6) INA [8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6)]);
(7) conviction for an act of treason (Sec. 349(a)(7) INA [8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7)]).
Administrative Standard of Evidence
As already noted, the actions listed above can cause loss of
U.S. citizenship only if performed voluntarily and with the inten-
tion of relinquishing U.S. citizenship. The Department has a uni-
form administrative standard of evidence based on the premise
that U.S. citizens intend to retain United States citizenship when
they obtain naturalization in a foreign state, subscribe to routine
declarations of allegiance to a foreign state, or accept non-policy
level employment with a foreign government.
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Disposition of Cases When Administrative Premise Is Applicable
In light of the administrative premise discussed above, a per-
son who:
(1) is naturalized in a foreign country;
(2) takes a routine oath of allegiance; or
(3) accepts non-policy level employment with a foreign govern-
ment and in so doing wishes to retain U.S. citizenship need not
submit prior to the commission of a potentially expatriating act a
statement or evidence of his or her intent to retain U.S. citizenship
since such an intent will be presumed.
When such cases come to the attention of a U.S. consular of-
ficer, the person concerned will be asked to complete a question-
naire to ascertain his or her intent toward U.S. citizenship. Unless
the person affirmatively asserts in the questionnaire that it was his
or her intention to relinquish U.S. citizenship, the consular officer
will certify that it was not the person's intent to relinquish U.S.
citizenship and, consequently, find that the person has retained
U.S. citizenship.
Disposition of Cases When Administrative Premise Is
Inapplicable
The premise that a person intends to retain U.S. citizenship is
not applicable when the individual:
(1) formally renounces U.S. citizenship before a consular
officer;
(2) takes a policy level position in a foreign state;
(3) is convicted of treason; or
(4) performs an act made potentially expatriating by statute
accompanied by conduct which is so inconsistent with retention of
U.S. citizenship that it compels a conclusion that the individual
intended to relinquish U.S. citizenship. (Such cases are very rare.)
Cases in categories 2, 3, and 4 will be developed carefully by




Persons Who Wish to Relinquish U.S. Citizenship
An individual who has performed any of the acts made poten-
tially expatriating by statute who wishes to lose U.S. citizenship
may do so by affirming in writing to a U.S. consular officer that the
act was performed with an intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship. Of
course, a person always has the option of seeking to formally re-
nounce U.S. citizenship in accordance with Section 349(a)(5) INA
[8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5)].
Applicability of Administrative Premise to Past Cases
The premise established by the administrative standard of evi-
dence is applicable to cases adjudicated previously. Persons who
previously lost U.S. citizenship may wish to have their cases recon-
sidered in light of this policy. A person may initiate such a recon-
sideration by submitting a request to the nearest U.S. consular of-
fice or by writing directly to:




Each case will be reviewed on its own merits taking into considera-
tion, for example, statements made by the person at the time of
the potentially expatriating act.
Dual Nationality
When a person is naturalized in a foreign state (or otherwise
possesses another nationality) and is thereafter found not to have
lost U.S. citizenship the individual consequently may possess dual
nationality. It is prudent, however, to check with authorities of the
other country to see if dual nationality is permissible under local
law. The United States does not favor dual nationality as a matter
of policy, but does recognize its existence in individual cases.
Questions
For further information, please contact the appropriate geo-
graphic division of the Office of Citizens Consular Services:




Inter-American Division (202) 647-3712
East Asia and Pacific Division (202) 647-3675
Near Eastern and South Asia Division (202) 647-3926
Africa Division (202) 647-4994
APPENDIX 111183
STATE DEPARTMENT FLYER ON IRISH CITIZENSHIP
It is the Department's understanding that under the Irish Na-
tionality and Citizenship Act of 1956, a person born outside Ire-
land may be recognized as an Irish national upon establishing to
the satisfaction of the Irish authorities that he or she was born of a
parent or grandparent who was born in Ireland. Since the Irish cit-
izenship is conferred by automatic operation of Irish law and not
by the act of naturalization, establishing a claim to Irish citizen-
ship by registering one's birth in the Foreign Birth Entry and ac-
quiring an Irish passport is considered simply a confirmation for
record purposes of the automatic acquisition of Irish citizenship at
birth and does not affect one's status as a United States citizen.
The person would, under those circumstances, be considered a
dual citizen.
183. This appendix is a reprint of an untitled and undated flyer on Irish citizenship
from the U.S. Department of State, a copy of which is on file with the author. The flyer was
issued in response to the 1956 Irish Act.
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